Jan. 22 marks the start of "Geneva II," the much-anticipated
international conference intended to bring a measure of political
stability to the ongoing conflict in Syria. The event is supposed to
bring together the Syrian government and its adversaries in what many
hope will be a settlement of that country's nearly three-year-old civil
war. Yet there is little reason to expect that this conference can
actually bring peace to Syria or its equally-troubled neighborhood, for
at least four reasons.
The first is Russia. Although Moscow and
Washington are jointly sponsoring the conference, the two have vastly
differing ideas about the ultimate outcome. Russia has long charged that
Syrian dictator Bashar Assad must be part of the political solution,
while President Obama has insisted that Assad "must go." Further, Russia
keeps charging that the Syrian rebels – whom it considers terrorists –
have not actually committed themselves to appear, and that the U.S.
lacks the clout to bring them to the table. That effectively leaves
Russia's proxy, the Assad regime, as the center of political gravity in
the discussion, at least as far as the Kremlin is concerned.
[See a collection of political cartoons on Syria.]
Moreover,
Russia continues to flood Syria with all manner of weapons, and clearly
stands behind Iran and its terrorist proxies, like Hezbollah, in their
attempt to shape the operating environment in the Ba'athist state. In
other words, while Moscow may have cooperated in getting rid of the
Syrian government's chemical weapons, it has no interest in abetting
U.S. interests in the Middle East – or anywhere else, for that matter.
The notion that Russia, because of its diplomatic engagement on the
Syria front, somehow is not determined to preserve its standing or that
of its allies, is contradictory to the facts on the ground and to recent
history.
Then there is Iran. Secretary of State John Kerry has
intimated that Iran will play a role in the negotiations. And although
the U.N. has now barred Iran from a formal seat at the table, the
Iranian regime is bound to cast a large shadow over the discussions.
The
Iranian regime has played a key role in perpetuating Assad's brutality
against his own people. Over the past two years, Iran has flooded Syria
with weapons and command personnel, and incited its terrorist proxy
Hezbollah to send up to 15,000 armed troops into the country in support
of Assad's regime. Iran's intentions revolve around creating a
pro-Tehran crescent in the Middle East – one deeply inimical to American
interests. These contributions hardly deserve the reward of determining
Syria's future, but the Iranian government, even without a formal seat
at the diplomatic table, could well steer the direction and the tenor of
the talks, much to the detriment of this peace process, and others.
[See a collection of political cartoons on Iran.]
The
third reason for pessimism in the run-up to "Geneva II" is that the
Syrian conflict remains a civil war conducted by and among ethnic and
religious sects on both sides. In almost every such war, there is no
common ground upon which to build a new government; more often than not
the objectives of the two sides are and remain utterly irreconcilable.
So it is likely to be in Syria, where the mantra of regime and
opposition forces alike remains "rule or die."
Finally, Syria has
failed to meet the deadline for removing all of its chemical weapons
from the country. That in and of itself isn't surprising. Assad – as
well as his sponsors in Tehran and Moscow – must surely know that a
comprehensive dismantlement of Syria's arsenal would make Assad
dispensable. Conversely, all the parties surely know that a drawn-out
dismantlement process would ensure the survivability of the Syrian
regime.
All these specific problems compound a general one: that
negotiating settlements to civil wars is often an excruciatingly long
process, even when it is successful. These factors should induce a sense
of caution concerning expectations for what "Geneva II" cann truly bring about.
Wednesday, 12 February 2014
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